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Responsibility for Another’s Wrong in Scotland: Stick with Lister or Twist with Mohamud?  
 
Dr Stephen Bogle* 
 
Should Scots courts follow the approach taken by the Supreme Court in Mohamud v Wm Morrison 
Supermarkets Plc or continue with the approach developed by the Inner House? Whether it is 
explicitly acknowledged or not, this is the question which now faces any court in Scotland when asked 
to determine if an act falls within the course of employment. This article plots out the development of 
vicarious liability in Scotland from the House of Lords decision in Lister to the Inner House decision 
in Vaickuviene. It argues that when compared to the approach taken by the Supreme Court, there is 
evidently a degree of divergence between the jurisprudence of both courts on how to determine 
whether an act is within the course of employment. It suggests that to follow Mohamud would be an 
important development, which raises significant questions about how grounds of liability are 




In recent years, the Supreme Court has made several significant decisions relating to vicarious 
liability,1 which pose important questions for jurisdictions, like Scotland, who draw heavily upon 
English tort law jurisprudence. One of the most pressing questions from a doctrinal perspective may 
be whether the law of Scotland should follow the approach taken by the Supreme Court in Mohamud 
v Wm Morrison Supermarkets Plc?2 Or should courts in Scotland continue with the approach they 
have taken since the House of Lords decision in Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd?3 In comparison to the case 
law concerning the establishment of an employment-type relationship where there has been very little 
Scots consideration,4 it appears that Scots courts have developed, since Lister, an approach to 
questions relating to the course of employment with subtle but important differences from that now 
                                                 
* Lecturer in Private Law, School of Law, University of Glasgow. 
1 Various Claimants v Catholic Child Welfare Society [2012] UKSC 56; [2013] 2 A.C. 1; Mohamud v Wm Morrison 
Supermarkets Plc [2016] UKSC 11; [2016] A.C. 677; Cox v Ministry of Justice [2016] UKSC 10; [2016] A.C. 660 and 
Armes v Nottinghamshire CC [2017] UKSC 60; [2018] A.C. 355. 
2 Mohamud [2016] A.C. 677. 
3 Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2001] UKHL 22; [2002] 1 A.C. 215. 
4 Catholic Child Welfare Society [2013] 2 A.C. 1; Cox [2016] A.C. 660; and Armes [2018] A.C. 355. Note, however, it 
was applied recently in Grubb v Shannon, 2018 S.L.T. (Sh. Ct) 193.  
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advocated by the Supreme Court.5 In fact, the Scottish approach is just one of several different 
approaches to Lister which have emerged in other jurisdictions since 1998. So the question for the 
Court of Session, when the opportunity arises, is should it stick with its interpretation of Lister or 
twist with Mohamud (which arguably includes its own interpretation of Lister)? Or even follow the 
approach of another jurisdiction? 
To help answer these questions, this article does two things. First, in order to determine which 
approach Scots courts should take, the present position of Scots law needs to be clarified. The 
approach in Scotland to Lister and vicarious liability has not always been clear and has generated 
discussion over the last few years.6 This article tries to offer a relatively detailed account of the 
decisions made in Scotland since Lister, with a view of establishing what the law is at present. 
Secondly, it is important to understand the direction Mohamud has taken and how that compares to 
the approach of the Inner House. Mohamud has been described as a hidden departure from the Lister 
close connection test.7 Others have noted that the “extremely liberal understanding of the ‘close 
connection’ test” which the Supreme Court has taken means “it is now difficult to conceive of many 
circumstances that will fall outside it”.8 Hence, Mohamud cannot be understood as a mere application 
of Lister or confined to its individual facts. Thus this article tries to make clear what was decided in 
Mohamud and how that approach differs from the recent jurisprudence of the Inner House. 
 
II. BEFORE LISTER 
 
The story starts in 2001. In Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd the House of Lords overruled the Court of 
Appeal’s judgment in ST v North Yorkshire CC decided in 1998.9 In ST, the Court of Appeal said that 
an employer could not be vicariously liable for an employee who had sexually assaulted a child, albeit 
the employer may have had overall responsibility for the welfare and safety of that child and charged 
the employee with ensuring the welfare and safety of that child. While a difficult decision for the 
                                                 
5 See Vaickuviene v J Sainsbury Plc [2013] CSIH 67; 2014 S.C. 147, per Lord Carloway at [22]–[23]. In this case, the 
Inner House indicated that the approach being developed by the Supreme Court, confirmed in Mohamud, differed from 
that taken by Scots courts since Lister. 
6 S. Arnell, “Employers’ vicarious liability—where are we now?”, 2010 Jur. Rev. 243; Lord Hope, “Tailoring the law on 
vicarious liability” (2013) 129 L.Q.R. 514; J. Thomson, Delictual Liability, 5th edn (Haywards Heath: Bloomsbury 
Professional, 2014), para.22.10; E.J. Russell, “Historic abuse: the hard reality for victims”, 2015 Jur. Rev. 53; D. Brodie, 
“Just a frolic”, 2015 Rep. L.B. 127-1, “Vicarious liability: the net tightens”, 2016 Rep. L.B. 129-1, Reparation: Liability 
for Delict (Edinburgh: W. Green), para.A4-009; M. Campbell, “Somerville Harsco Infrastructure Ltd: transferred intent 
and the scope of vicarious liability” (2016) 20(2) Edin. L.R. 211; and B. Lindsay, “Fostering a new age?” (2018) 22(2) 
Edin. L.R. 294. 
7 S.S.H. Chan, “Hidden Departure from the Lister Close Connection Test” (2016) 3 L.M.C.L.Q. 352. 
8 J. Plunkett, “Taking stock of vicarious liability” (2016) 132 L.Q.R. 556, 561. 
9 ST v North Yorkshire CC [1998] EWCA Civ 1208. 
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Court of Appeal in terms of policy and outcome—leaving the victim without an effective remedy—
it was nevertheless the result of a rather simple application of the existing tests of vicarious liability 
to the facts of the case. Specifically, the court asked the question, often asked by both Scots and 
English courts and drawn from Salmond on tort law, that is: was the act complained of an 
unauthorised mode of carrying out an authorised action?10 The answer was, no. However, in coming 
to this decision Butler-Sloss LJ did remark that: 
 
“I find it difficult to visualise the circumstances in which an act of the teacher can be an 
unauthorised mode of carrying out an authorised act, although I would not wish to close the 
door on the possibility.”11 
 
In the same year, the Canadian Supreme Court went through that door in the case of Bazley v Curry.12 
Indeed, McLachlin J considered ST v North Yorkshire CC and criticised its rigid application of the 
Salmond tests, she said: 
 
“Instead of describing the act in terms of the employee’s duties of supervising and caring for 
vulnerable students during a study trip abroad, the Court of Appeal cast it in terms unrelated to 
those duties. Important legal decisions should not turn on such semantics.”13 
 
After analysing the jurisprudence, the Canadian Supreme Court said: 
 
“Underlying the cases holding employers vicariously liable for the unauthorized acts of 
employees is the idea that employers may justly be held liable where the act falls within the 
ambit of the risk that the employer’s enterprise creates or exacerbates.”14 
 
On this basis, the court concluded that when determining the existence of vicarious liability for an 
unauthorised and intentional act of an employee—which may indeed amount to a criminal act—it 
should be guided by several principles if the existing case law fails to provide an answer. However, 
before stating those principles the court said that “the fundamental question is whether the wrongful 
                                                 
10 J.W. Salmond, The Law of Torts: A Treatise on the English Law of Liability for Civil Injuries, 1st edn (1907), pp.78–
79. 
11 ST [1998] EWCA Civ 1208, per Butler-Sloss LJ at [18]. 
12 Bazley v Curry [1999] 2 SCR 534. An approach which was subsequently followed in Jacobi v Griffiths [1999] 2 SCR 
570. 
13 Bazley [1999] 2 SCR 534 at [24]. 
14 Bazley [1999] 2 SCR 534 at [37]. 
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act is sufficiently related to conduct authorized by the employer to justify the imposition of vicarious 
liability”.15 These principles articulated by the court should then, accordingly, be used to help 
determine if there is a sufficiently close relationship between the wrongful act and what the employee 
was entitled to do; these were: the opportunity provided by the enterprise of the employer; whether 
the wrong furthered the employer’s enterprise, albeit in a way which the employer would not wish; 
whether the act was related to “friction, confrontation or intimacy” which was inherent in the 
employer’s enterprise; the power which the employer granted to the employee over the victim; and 
the vulnerability of potential victims for whom the employer was responsible. 
Commenting upon the Canadian Supreme Court’s decision, Peter Cane said that “developed in this 
way, the close connection test is a genuine advance on the unauthorised conduct/unauthorised mode 
distinction”.16 For him, it helped explain why an employer can in some instances be held accountable 
for conduct which was otherwise “antithetical to the aims of the employer’s activity”.17 Additionally, 
he noted that it gave judges, in the first instance, a sequence of questions which they can pose when 
faced with a set of facts and an argument that the act was outwith the course of employment. However, 
what is also evident from Bazley and Cane’s subsequent analysis is that to take this approach and to 
ask Bazley-type questions you need to be comfortable with judges making these sorts of decisions 
about the extension of liability and weighing up what will be, at times, competing objectives. 
According to Cane, it requires that an appellate judge determine whether they interpret the facts as 
well as the policy-based questions in the same way as the judge in the first instance. In other words, 
it openly allows for disagreement about how facts should be organised and interpreted and how 
different policy aims should be balanced. As Lord Hope has noted, to take this approach you need to 
be open to the merging of policy and criteria-based questions when determining liability.18 
Understanding Lister against this backdrop is important. It explains why, in going through the same 
door that Butler-Sloss LJ pointed towards, and that Bazley confidently opened, the House of Lords 
nonetheless downplayed the degree to which they were innovating within the existing law and the 
extent to which policy considerations, such as those discussed by McLachlin J, were necessary when 




                                                 
15 Bazley [1999] 2 SCR 534 at [41]. 
16 P. Cane, “Vicarious liability for sexual abuse” (2000) 116 L.Q.R. 21, 24. 
17 Cane, “Vicarious liability for sexual abuse” (2000) 116 L.Q.R. 21, 25. 
18 Lord Hope, “Tailoring the law on vicarious liability” (2013) 129 L.Q.R. 514, 525. 
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In Lister, the House of Lords stressed that the approach taken by the Court of Appeal in ST was too 
narrow and restrictive, both in how it formulated the law and how it interpreted the existing case law. 
First, the court underlined that it was possible for an employer to be held vicariously liable for 
intentional wrongdoing, even if that amounted to something which was criminal.19 It was critical of 
passages from Butler-Sloss LJ’s judgment in ST,20 which suggested otherwise.21 According to the 
House of Lords, and contrary to the Court of Appeal, potential liability of an employer for intentional 
wrongs should not be confined to particular tasks or individual cases but rather acknowledged as a 
general statement of law and Morris v CW Martin & Sons Ltd22 should be interpreted as such. 
Secondly, it was emphasised that the Salmond test should not be applied rigidly or mechanically but 
rather in a pragmatic and factually sensitive manner.23 Lord Steyn said for example that “Employing 
the traditional methodology of English law [i.e. the Salmond tests]” it was possible to find the 
employers vicariously liable.24 “A convenient starting point” for Lord Clyde was “the exposition 
which can be traced from the first edition of Salmond on Torts”.25 It was the “classic” test according 
to Lord Hobhouse, and an approach which he used to hold the employers vicariously liable in Lister.26 
According to Lord Millet, it has “stood the test of time” but is “not without blemish”.27 He went on 
to highlight a neglected passage in Salmond “which is unfortunately less often cited”, that is an 
employer can be vicariously liable for an act which he has not authorised but which are nevertheless 
so connected with acts which he has authorised although they are done in an improper way. For his 
Lordship this could be 
 
“usefully elided to impose vicarious liability where the authorised acts of the employee are so 
connected with acts which the employer has authorised that they may properly be regarded as 
being within the scope of his employment”.28 
 
The House of Lords unanimously emphasised the close connection test, used in Bazley, could be 
found in the original Salmond formulation of the test, and it was from here that the court could 
                                                 
19 Lister [2002] 1 A.C. 215, per Lord Millet at [72]–[77]. 
20 ST [11]-[19] per Butler-Sloss LJ. 
21 Lister [2002] 1 A.C. 215, per Lord Steyn at [20]–[24]and per Lord Hobhouse at [56]–[57]. 
22 Morris v CW Martin & Sons Ltd [1966] 1 Q.B. 716; [1965] 3 W.L.R. 276. 
23 Lister [2002] 1 A.C. 215, per Lord Steyn at [16], [21]; per Lord Clyde at [41]; and per Lord Millett at [69]–[70]. 
24 Lister [2002] 1 A.C. 215 at [28]. 
25 Lister [2002] 1 A.C. 215 at [36]. 
26 Lister [2002] 1 A.C. 215 at [59]. 
27 Lister [2002] 1 A.C. 215 at [67]. 
28 Lister [2002] 1 A.C. 215, per Lord Millett at [69]. 
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establish vicarious liability in a case such as Lister.29 Thirdly, the House of Lords did not feel that it 
was necessary to revert to policy-based considerations when determining liability in Lister; it was 
possible, according to each individual judgment given by the Lords, to come to a conclusion on 
vicarious liability based on the facts and a broader interpretation than that taken in ST of the existing 
law.30 On that basis, they did not follow the approach taken in Bazley, in spite of citing it with 
approval and effectively coming to the same conclusion and adopting the same formulation of the 
question: was the act complained of closely or so/sufficiently connected to the scope/course of 
employment? For the House of Lords, you can answer this question without broader discussions of 
policy or rationale. 
 
IV. AFTER LISTER 
 
Following the House of Lords judgment in Lister there was criticism that the Lords did not take the 
opportunity to explore the rationale or justification for vicarious liability while nevertheless 
introducing a significant extension of that liability.31 Some argued that this would not only help courts 
apply vicarious liability in the future but provide some much-needed explanation as to why ST was 
overruled.32 Additionally, others found the tests articulated by the court difficult to apply in practice 
while offering no real improvement on the earlier formulation of an unauthorised mode of an 
authorised act.33 In part this may be because the Lords took a narrower approach to the close 
connection test in comparison to other jurisdictions; that is, although favourable reference was made 
to Bazley by their Lordships, the formulation by the Canadian Supreme Court of what was sufficiently 
close or strongly connected was subtly different from how the House of Lords used it in Lister. In 
Markesinis and Deakin's Tort Law, the authors point out that in Bazley “the connection is between 
                                                 
29 Lister [2002] 1 A.C. 215, per Lord Steyn at [24]–[28]; per Lord Clyde at [36]–[37]; per Lord Hobhouse at [59]; and 
per Lord Millett at [69]. 
30 Lister [2002] 1 A.C. 215 at [23]–[28]; per Lord Clyde at [34]; per Lord Hobhouse at [60]; and per Lord Millett at [83]. 
31 P. Giliker, “Rough Justice in an Unjust World” (2002) 65 M.L.R. 269. 
32 Giliker, “Rough Justice in an Unjust World” (2002) 65 M.L.R. 269. 
33 Lord Nicholls said in Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v Salaam [2002] UKHL 48; [2002] 3 W.L.R. 1913 at [25], that Lister 
“affords no guidance on the type or degree of connection which will normally be regarded as sufficiently close”. Lord 
Hardiman in the Irish Supreme Court was also very critical in O’Keeffe v Hickey [2008] IESC 72. Also see Clerk & 
Lindsell on Tort, edited by M.A. Jones et al, 22nd edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2017), para.6-29, which says: “Lister 
gives rise to considerable confusion.” Additionally, see S. Deakin, A. Johnston, and B.S. Markesinis, Markesinis and 
Deakin’s Tort Law, 7th edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 579, which says: “Lister simply replaces one verbal 
formula … with another which in the long run may prove no more inadequate to the task in hand.” Further, in Winfield 
and Jolowicz on Tort, edited by W.E. Peel and J. Goudkamp, 19th edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2014), para.2-031, 
the authors say that some of the criticism is “harsh” but nonetheless acknowledge that “the fact remains that it may still 
be very difficult to determine incidents for which the employer is responsible in these cases”. 
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the wrong and the risks which are inherent in the enterprise undertaken by the employer”.34 Whereas 
in Lister, the pertinent connection was between the scope of employment garnered from the implied 
and express terms of employment broadly defined and the wrong complained of.  
The Australian courts noted this divergence in approach between the House of Lords and the 
Canadian Supreme Court,35 rejecting the approach taken in Lister and instead forging a different path 
to remedy cases similar to Lister and Bazley. In Prince Alfred College Inc v ADC,36 for example, the 
High Court of Australia suggested another method by which to determine whether the wrongful act 
was within the course of employment, saying that when determining this the court must take into 
consideration the “power, trust, control and the ability to achieve intimacy with the victim”.37 It 
appears that there is a twofold method developed by the Australia High Court in that you determine 
scope of employment by asking such questions about trust, power and control and then ask if the 
employment provided the “occasion” not the mere opportunity for the wrongdoing.38 The High Court 
explained39: 
 
“Consequently, in cases of this kind, the relevant approach is to consider any special role that 
the employer has assigned to the employee and the position in which the employee is thereby 
placed vis-à-vis the victim. In determining whether the apparent performance of such a role 
may be said to give the ‘occasion’ for the wrongful act, particular features may be taken into 
account. They include authority, power, trust, control and the ability to achieve intimacy with 
the victim. The latter feature may be especially important. Where, in such circumstances, the 
employee takes advantage of his or her position with respect to the victim, that may suffice to 
determine that the wrongful act should be regarded as committed in the course or scope of 
employment and as such render the employer vicariously liable.” 
 
To speak of an opportunity appears to be too wide and describes the circumstances under which the 
wrong took place without first conceptualising what was the scope of the employment. Following this 
approach, asking about the occasion frames matters from the perspective of the role of the employee 
rather than working backwards from the wrong towards the employment. This means there is less 
focus on broader questions of enterprise risk and a far narrower focus on the terms of the job delegated 
                                                 
34 Markesinis and Deakin's Tort Law (2012) 579. 
35 State of New South Wales v Lepore [2003] HCA 4, per Gaudron J at [117]–[126] and per Kirby J at [273]=[277]. 
36 Prince Alfred College Inc v ADC [2016] HCA 37. 
37 Prince Alfred College Inc v ADC [2016] HCA 37 at [82]. 
38 Charlesworth & Percy on Neglience, edited by C.T. Walton et al, 14th edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2018), para.7-
69. 
39 Prince Alfred College Inc v ADC [2016] HCA 37 at [81]. 
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and whether that relates to the wrong committed. The court said “it is consistent in result with Lister 
v Hesley Hall Ltd, although different in process of reasoning”.40 As will be shown below, the Inner 
House of the Court of Session as well as the Supreme Court have also claimed to be offering a faithful 
reading of Lister. In contrast, the Irish Supreme Court has been less concerned with being consistent 
with the House of Lords decision in Lister. 
Indeed, in 2008, the Irish Supreme Court was highly critical of Lister in the case O’Keeffe v 
Hickey.41 In analysing Lord Steyn’s reasoning, Hardiman J said that he “simply cannot see” how the 
“traditional methodology of English law” could lead to the result in Lister. He could not agree that 
the “common law position” could establish on the basis of the facts of Lister that there was a close 
connection.42 Additionally, he said that the unauthorised mode of an authorised action articulated in 
the first edition of Salmond, was not “at all capable of being the ‘germ’ of the close connection test”.43 
Hardiman J, however, found Lord Hobhouse’s analysis more convincing, given that he based his 
decision on the basis of a non-delegable duty resting upon the employer and giving rise to liability 
rather than manipulating the doctrines of vicarious liability to give such a result. Moreover, Hardiman 
J remarked that the court in Bazley was prepared to admit that there was no precedential basis for 
extending liability, therefore openly and transparently drawing from policy to extend liability, 
whereas the House of Lords in Lister claimed (disingenuously), “to find a basis in pre-existing 
English cases and academic writings leading seamlessly to the finding of liability in Lister”.44 It was 
not until 2017 that the Supreme Court of Ireland changed, or clarified, its position, stating that the 
close connection test had been adopted in Ireland but that Hardiman J’s judgment provided salient 
warnings about its limitations.45 Indeed, not only did the Irish Supreme Court signal a change in tack 
but aligned itself towards the Canadian approach outlined in Bazley rather than the narrower Lister 
approach.46 
 
V. RECEPTION IN SCOTLAND 
 
The recent history of Lister’s reception into Scots law is important. It helps stress the distance between 
where the law in Scotland is at present and where the approach taken by the Supreme Court in 
                                                 
40 Prince Alfred College Inc v ADC [2016] HCA 37 at [83]. 
41 O’Keeffe v Hickey [2008] IESC 72. Hardiman J gave the leading judgment, with Murray CJ and Denham J concurring. 
In separate judgments Fennelly J and Geoghegan J dissented with regard to whether the close connection test was useful. 
42 O’Keeffe [2008] IESC 72, per Lord Hardiman at [98].  
43 O’Keeffe [2008] IESC 72, per Lord Hardiman at [109]. 
44 O’Keeffe [2008] IESC 72, per Lord Hardiman at [120]. 
45 Hickey v McGowan [2017] IESC 6. 
46 J. Gallen, “Vicarious liability and historic abuse: a critical analysis of Hickey v McGowan” (2017) 58 Irish Jurist 184. 
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Mohamud has taken the law of England and Wales. Plotting out the reception also serves to 
demonstrate how a divergence in approach can easily develop within the jurisprudence of the law of 
Scotland and that of England and Wales, despite both jurisdictions apparently drawing upon the same 
leading authorities. Additionally, describing the adoption of Lister in Scotland makes clear what is 
being left behind when a court adopts the Mohamud approach. Indeed, how a Scots court has 
understood Lister over the last 18 years and has continued to apply Lister in recent cases may mean 
that the eventual adoption of Mohamud is not merely an incremental development but a larger step 
for the law of Scotland.  
In general, the Scots courts have claimed to be faithful to how the House of Lords articulated 
the law of vicarious liability in Lister. Moreover, Scots judges have tended to take the judgments of 
the Lords at face value: Lister was merely applying the traditional Salmond test. This being said, the 
Inner House has have been very cautious in its application of the close connection test when it comes 
to the question of extensions of liability based on policy. A key point, however, is that unlike the 
Inner House, it has been the lower Scottish courts who have understood Lister as a significant change 
in the law. Some Scots courts have not adopted the House of Lords’ explanation in Lister that it was 
merely applying the existing law as it stood in 2001, but rather understood Lister as an important 
point of departure. In addition to these general points, a few other points might be added which are 
relevant to the development of vicarious liability in Scotland. 
First, on the basis of the reported case law, it appears that pleaders in Scotland have been 
reluctant to argue direct liability or non-delegation liability on the same facts as they have pleaded 
vicarious liability. That is, reported case law does not suggest that counsel in Scotland have attempted 
to develop other grounds of potential liability. Part of this may be due to the strict requirements of 
Scots civil procedure, which means when faced with facts which give rise to a vicarious liability claim 
there is a reluctance to explore alternative forms of liability. Or it may be simply because more 
explorative arguments about other potential grounds of liability have not been reported. Secondly, 
although other grounds of potential liability have not been developed in Scotland, it has, nevertheless, 
been counsel rather than the judiciary in Scotland who have pressed the development of the law of 
vicarious liability since Lister and generally understood it to be a departure from the traditional 
Salmond approach.  
With these points in mind, it could be said that the reception of Lister into the law of Scotland 
can be divided into three rough stages. First, there was the general application of Lister in like-for-
like factual scenarios, exclusively confined to cases of historic sexual or physical abuse of children. 
Secondly, there were attempts to extend Lister to other factual scenarios, which was accepted in 
principle but denied in application. Thirdly, there was the Inner House’s interpretation of Lister which 
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claimed to be faithful to Lord Steyn and Lord Clyde’s approach but, importantly, also saw the Inner 
House develop a particular focus on the individual facts of the act itself, which implicitly introduced 
consideration of the motive of the wrongdoer. 
 
1. Applying Lister to similar facts 
The first stage was the initial application of Lister. In fact, it only took six months after the decision 
in Lister was handed down for the sheriff court in Dumfries to apply it in Gorrie v Marist Brothers.47 
Whilst a pupil at St Joseph’s College in the early 1970s, the pursuer’s schoolteacher sexually abused 
him, but it was not until the late 1990s that he raised his case against the Marist Brothers (who had 
run the school at the material time). Prior to the decision in Lister, there was a preliminary debate 
where the pursuers conceded that they could not establish vicarious liability against the employer. 
But following Lister, which came only a few months after this concession, they motioned to adjust 
their argument. On behalf of the pursuer it was argued48  
 
“the House of Lords had departed from the law as it had previously been understood to be and 
had ruled that an employer could be liable for the clandestine acts of his employee if those acts 
were committed in circumstances brought about by the nature of that employee’s employment. 
That would cover sexual abuse where an opportunity for that abuse to occur had been created 
by the specific tasks which an employer required an employee to carry out in the performance 
of his duties”. 
 
Originally, therefore, the pursuers had pleaded negligence on the basis that the Marist Brothers, at the 
relevant time, had an inadequate system of supervision and monitoring which amounted to a breach 
of their duty of care. Sheriff Principal McInnes allowed the pursuer’s adjustments, and applied Lister 
saying49: 
 
“There was a close proximity or neighbourhood between the pursuer, who was a pupil, and the 
Marist Brothers who were responsible for his care. There were ample averments to establish 
the necessary degree of proximity. On the basis of the decision of the House of Lords in Lister, 
                                                 
47 Gorrie v Marist Brothers (A206/99), unreported, 2001, Dumfries Sheriff Court. It was also debated by counsel in Royal 
Bank of Scotland v Bannerman Johnstone Maclay, 2003 S.C. 125; 2003 S.L.T. 181. In spite of important questions raised 
by counsel’s debate regarding Lister’s application and scope, Lord Macfayden said very little to clarify or explain how 
Lister should be understood or applied in Scotland. 
48 Gorrie, unreported, 2001, Dumfries Sheriff Court, para.2.1. 
49 Gorrie, unreported, 2001, Dumfries Sheriff Court, para.6.5. 
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supra it would be fair and reasonable to impose a duty of care on the Marist Brothers in respect 
of a boy in a boarding school run by them.” 
 
Reading the decision in Gorrie, it could be reasonably suggested that the sheriff understood Lister to 
change the existing law rather than merely clarify it; that Lister specifically applied to the 
circumstances of concealed wrongful acts; that the course of employment could be characterised by 
taking into consideration that the employment offered to the employee a recognised opportunity to 
commit a wrong, but it was important to first determine what that employment was; that the question 
concerned consideration of the proximity between the act and the employment; and, importantly in 
these instances, that whether liability attached included a consideration of policy, but that the House 
of Lords had signalled that this type of extension was acceptable. A similar understanding of Lister 
was taken by the Outer House in 2005 in B v Murray (No.2), although the Lister formula was not set 
out in any detail, they were accepted as part of the law of Scotland.50 This case was raised against the 
Congregation of the Poor Sisters of Nazareth, along with approximately 290 other actions which all 
concerned physical abuse experienced by children whilst they were in care. In the first instance, the 
Lord Ordinary considered whether to allow the defender’s plea of limitation given that the pursuers’ 
claims related to physical abuse carried out in the 1960s and 70s.51 The pursuers lost, failing to 
convince the Lord Ordinary to use his discretion. Indeed, B v Murray (No.2) is just one of many in 
Scotland, where following Lister, victims of institutional abuse were excluded from establishing their 
claim in the Court of Session due to the court’s refusal to use its discretion relating to limitation.52 Of 
note at present, however, is one line of argument put forward in B v Murray (No.2): Lister had 
changed the law in Scotland and, on that basis, it would significantly prejudice the defenders if the 
Lord Ordinary were to, after the fact, waive limitation. Lord Drummond Young said53: 
 
“Closely related to the social and other changes discussed in the previous section is the effect 
of changes in the law in the last 10 years. In many cases where an application is made under s 
                                                 
50 B v Murray (No.2), 2005 S.L.T. 982.  
51 Ultimately, he did not allow the case to proceed on the basis that it would be inequitable. The pursuer’s subsequent 
reclaiming motion was dismissed by the First Division of the Inner House, B v Murray (No.2) [2007] CSIH 39; 2007 S.C. 
688 and the decision of the Inner House was upheld by the House of Lords, B v Murray (No.2) [2008] UKHL 32; 2008 
S.C. (H.L.) 146. As per the Limitation (Childhood Abuse) (Scotland) Act 2017, s.17A of the Prescription and Limitation 
(Scotland) Act 1973 now removes the three-year limitation period for abuse, including sexual, physical, and emotional 
abuse.  
52 For a summary and justified criticism of the law of limitation in Scotland prior to 2017, see E. Russell, “Historic abuse: 
the hard reality of victims”, 2015 Jur. Rev. 53. Also see Lord Hope, “Tailoring the law on vicarious liability” (2013) 129 
L.Q.R. 514. 
53 B v Murray (No.2), 2005 S.L.T. 982 at [117]. 
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19A this will not be a relevant factor because the law has remained constant. In the present case, 
however, the law has changed as a result of the decision of the House of Lords in Lister v Hesley 
Hall Ltd. That case substantially extended the law of vicarious liability for the criminal acts of 
employees and other agents. In that case the owners of a boarding school were held vicariously 
liable for acts of sexual abuse committed by the warden of a boarding house. Previously it was 
generally understood that delicts of a criminal nature were unlikely to give rise to vicarious 
liability because they were not within the scope of the perpetrator’s employment. In that case, 
however, it was held that vicarious liability could be established if there was a sufficient 
connection between the criminal acts and the work that the person responsible had been 
employed to do. Where the care of children was entrusted to an employee, and the employee 
abused his position of trust, such a connection existed, and the employers were vicariously 
liable.” 
 
His Lordship understood Lister to change the law; that it applied specifically to delicts which were 
of a criminal nature; that it was the position of trust that gave rise to liability in Lister; and that Lister 
was an “an example of a more liberal approach to vicarious liability that has developed over the last 
10 or 15 years”.54 In B v Murray (No.2), the court heard evidence from Sheriff A.G. McCulloch about 
the legal position relating to vicarious liability and criminal acts in the 1980s55: 
 
“He accepted that the question of vicarious liability had been clarified by the decision in Lister. 
He further accepted that in the 1980s the attitude of the legal profession to the present claims 
might have been different, although he stated that he would like to think that the pursuers would 
not have been turned away without a remedy. He did accept that these cases involved to some 
extent pushing out the boundaries of the law.” 
 
Another reported case in Scotland to reference Lister is JM v Fife Council,56 around four years after 
the House of Lords decision. In this case, the pursuer suffered between 1963 and 1966, both non-
sexual and sexual abuse from his house master whilst under the residential care of the local authority. 
He did not raise his action in the Outer House until 2006, where the defenders did not make a plea of 
limitation and indeed admitted liability. However, the defenders disputed the level of damages and 
                                                 
54 B v Murray (No.2), 2005 S.L.T. 982 at [118]. 
55 B v Murray (No.2), 2005 S.L.T. 982 at [118]. 
56 JM v Fife Council [2008] CSIH 63; 2009 S.C. 163. 
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the date from which his damages should run.57 Lister was only mentioned in passing and not 
considered in any depth but was considered to apply in this instance and be uncontroversial in 
application. That is, not only did the defenders cede this point before litigation but both the Outer and 
Inner House took it for granted that Lister now applied in Scotland. Offering the leading judgment, 
Lord President Hamilton made it explicit, in his closing remarks, that the type of vicarious liability 
which attached to the defenders in this case “may not have been clear until the decision of the House 
of Lords in Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd”.58 Although there is no discussion of Lister when it is put into 
context it appears that what was undisputed in the Outer House following Lister: that in situations of 
criminal abuse of minors, whilst under the care an institution such as a resident school, it is possible 
to hold the employer vicariously liable for the actions of the employee who carried out such criminal 
acts. It is also noticeable that in many of the cases preceding JM v Fife Council where limitation was 
argued, there was no dispute as to whether a monastic order, congregation of nuns or unincorporated 
charitable organisation could be held as an employer. Lister was therefore being applied in Scotland 
narrowly and by analogy rather than by interpreting the ratio or analysing the underlying reasoning 
or justifications of the House of Lords. Put simply, Scottish courts were not being asked in these cases 
by either pursuers or defenders to do this nor did it appear necessary in these cases to treat Lister as 
any more than an exception, albeit an important one, to the normal doctrines and authority which 
applied to vicarious liability. 
 
2. Accepting a wider remit for Lister 
The second stage of Lister’s reception into Scots law relates to situations where Lister’s application 
was extended beyond cases of sexual abuse of minors in care. Importantly, although it was accepted 
that Lister can apply to other factual scenarios, the Court of Session did not suggest that it was 
extending vicarious liability in these cases but merely applying Lister.59 For example, this is captured 
in the Outer House case of Sharp v Highlands and Islands Fire Board60 where the defenders 
questioned the applicability of Lister beyond cases of abuse of minors in care. The pursuer had 
suffered a broken leg while playing a football match organised by his employers as a result of his 
colleague’s aggressive tackle. It was the pursuer’s contention that the injury was caused by his fellow 
employee during the course of his employment. Counsel for the fire board sought to distinguish Lister 
                                                 
57 J v Fife Council [2007] CSOH 7; 2007 S.L.T. 85. 
58 JM v Fife Council [2008] CSIH 63; 2009 S.C. 163 at [38]. 
59 See also Vance v North Lanarkshire Council [2008] CSOH 70. However, it is of note that vicarious liability was 
accepted by the defenders for the violent actions of a doorman in Ashmore v Rock Steady Security Ltd [2006] CSOH 30. 
60 Sharp v Highlands and Islands Fire Board [2005] CSOH 111; 2005 S.L.T. 855. 
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on the basis of its facts. In alternative, they sought to apply the test articulated by Lord Reed in the 
pre-Lister case of Ward v Scotrail Railways Ltd61; that is, it should be asked whether the conduct “fell 
outwith the employee’s authorised functions and was motivated by purely personal emotions”.62 In 
Ward, Lord Reed also quoted the familiar passages from Salmond and it was argued by the employer 
that the Salmond question should be asked in this case not the Lister question. Accordingly, the court 
should ask either whether the wrongful act was authorised by the employer or whether the act was a 
wrongful and unauthorised mode of doing some act authorised by the master.  
In putting forward this argument, counsel for the fire board were seeking to establish a 
distinction between Lister and the pre-existing law to ensure that Lister was used as an exception to 
the existing law rather than a general replacement of the pre-2001 case law on vicarious liability. In 
stressing the pre-Lister position of Ward, the fire board sought to ensure that this would remain the 
approach to negligent acts which do not immediately strike the court to be within the course of 
employment. The defender’s reliance on Ward is also important because Lord Reed’s approach in 
that case is arguably an example of how even before Lister there were subtleties to how the Salmond 
tests and questions would be formulated and applied. As already mentioned, Lord Reed in Ward 
focused, when determining the course of employment, on the latter part of the Salmond test preferring 
to ask if the unauthorised and wrongful act is an independent act which is outside the scope of his 
employment. In Sharp, however, Lord Macphail was certain that “the leading authority on the matter 
in both Scotland and England is now Lister”. Rather than see Lister as an exception or as a rephrasing 
of the Salmond questions, he said that the question was now whether the “actions were so closely 
connected with [the] employment [of the defender] that it would be fair and just to hold the first 
defenders vicariously liable”.63 Whatever the law before Lister, it is important to note that Lord 
MacPhail interpreted the question to include a consideration of whether it was fair and reasonable as 
well as closely connected, but as will be discussed below, this is something which the Inner House 
has been very reluctant to do.  
 
3. Inner House interpreting Lister 
Around five years later, there was the third stage of Lister’s reception into Scots law. Indeed, the case 
of Wilson v Exel UK Ltd (t/a Exel) gave the Inner House its first opportunity to consider Lister and 
                                                 
61 Ward v Scotrail Railways Ltd, 1999 S.C. 255. 
62 Ward, 1999 S.C. 255, per Lord Reed at 264. 
63 Sharp, 2005 S.L.T. 855 at [30]. 
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give guidance on how it should be applied.64 It was heard by the First Division, with both the Lord 
President (Lord Hamilton) and the Lord Justice-Clerk (Carloway) giving judgments. For his part, 
Lord Hamilton interpreted Lister as a reformulation of or a gloss upon the established Salmond test, 
that 
 
“a master is liable even for acts which he has not authorised provided that they are so connected 
with acts which he has authorised, that they may rightly be regarded as modes—although 
improper modes—of doing them”.65 
 
He noted that the House of Lords offered different reasons for adopting the close connection test but 
nevertheless concluded that “the central emphasis of the majority of their Lordships was on the close 
connection between the task with which the employee had been charged and the conduct complained 
of”.66 Because, on this basis, Lord Hamilton did not find, in this specific instance, a close connection 
between the task of the employee and what was complained of by the pursuer, he said it was 
 
“unnecessary to address the further question—which is one of legal policy—as to whether it 
was so closely connected with the employer that it would be fair and just to hold the employers 
vicariously liable”.67 
 
Upon making this point, he acknowledged that the circumstances in which an employer might be 
found vicariously liable for the intentional wrongdoing of an employee are not normally close to the 
employment but that this area of law should develop incrementally on a case by case basis. While 
acknowledging vicarious liability for intentional wrongdoing was possible, Lord Hamilton said “in 
any uncertain case the seminal judgements of the Supreme Court of Canada in Bazley v Curry and 
Jacboi v Griffiths will require to be considered”.68 In sum, Lord Hamilton interpreted Lister fairly 
narrowly, he was strict when it came to formulating the task of the employee, and appeared to suggest 
that only if decided case law and existing methods of analysis did not provide an answer, it might 
then be necessary to ask if it was fair and just to extend liability. There was no wider consideration 
                                                 
64 Wilson v Exel UK Ltd (t/a Exel) [2010] CSIH 35; 2010 S.L.T. 671. Although the Inner House did clarify in 2007 that 
Lister applied to questions relating to whether the act complained of took place within the scope of employment and was 
not concerned with the initial question of whether there was an employment-type relationship in the first place, see McE 
v de La Salle Brothers[2007] CSIH 27; 2007 S.C. 556, per Lord Osborne at [132], [144]–[146] and per Lord Marnoch at 
[200].  
65 Salmond, The Law of Torts (1907), pp.83–83. 
66 Wilson, 2010 S.L.T. 671 at [7]. 
67 Wilson, 2010 S.L.T. 671 at [12]. 
68 Wilson, 2010 S.L.T. 671 at [13]. 
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of enterprise risk or whether on the basis of policy, the employer should be held liable. For Lord 
Hamilton, the existing tests could be applied and gave a clear answer. 
Lord Carloway gave what could be described as the leading judgment in Wilson. Like Lord Hamilton, 
Lord Carloway too stressed that the Lords in Lister were not necessarily consistent with each other 
in terms of their reasoning but concluded that “the case must now be taken as definitive in establishing 
when vicarious liability is to attach to an employer for his employee’s actings”.69 He appeared also 
to take the same approach as Lord Hamilton to the Lister and policy questions; that is, you will only 
ask whether it is fair and just in “new circumstance of potential liability” whereas in Wilson, “the 
ground … is well trodden”.70 In theory, he was prepared to acknowledge, for example, that workplace 
pranks could fall within the task of an employee, but in this instance, they did not. The close 
connection test, for Lord Carloway, as it was for Lord Hamilton, was a gloss upon the Salmond test 
of an authorised mode of an authorised action. He found authority, in Lister, to suggest that Salmond’s 
approach was still useful suggesting that 
 
“the manner in which Lord Steyn [in Lister] therefore analysed the liability of the defendants 
in Lister was to look at what their business was, and the part played in that business by the 
employee, and to consider whether sufficient connection had been established between the 
employee’s actions and what he was supposed to be doing”.71 
 
It was possible for Lord Carloway to find additional support for this in Lister, drawing from Lord 
Clyde’s judgment saying he “too emphasised the importance of the traditional approach” of Salmond 
and Kirby v National Coal Board.72 
On this basis, Lord Carloway drew from Lord Clyde’s judgment in Lister three propositions which 
should assist a court when trying to determine the nature of the employee’s task and whether what 
they did was closely connected. First, “the context of the act complained of should be looked at and 
not just the act itself”; secondly, “time and place were always relevant but may not be conclusive”; 
and thirdly, “the fact that the employment provided the opportunity for the act to occur at a particular 
time and place is not necessarily enough”, rather there must be a greater or stronger connection 
between the task or scope of employment and the act complained of. So far, this approach is familiar 
but it is here that Lord Carloway introduced an additional proposition or method, which he supposed 
                                                 
69 Wilson, 2010 S.L.T. 671 at [24]. 
70 Wilson, 2010 S.L.T. 671 at [25]. 
71 Wilson, 2010 S.L.T. 671 at [26]. 
72 Wilson, 2010 S.L.T. 671 at [27]. 
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could be used in these circumstances. Lord Carloway quoted from Lord Cullen’s decision in Central 
Motors (Glasgow) Ltd v Cessnock Garage and Motor Co saying that the question should be whether 
the act falls into the “pure personal and independent sphere of life and action”.73 If it does, then it 
should be considered as outwith the course of employment. However, to ask this question is not the 
same as a general level analysis of the connection between the act and the nature of the employment.74 
To take this approach, the court is concerned with the motive of the employee, and whether the motive 
relates to the nature of the employment.75 Lord Carloway introduces it as an alternative approach, but 
one which he says is familiar and would not lead to a different result. According to Lord Carloway, 
it is equally possible to achieve the same result from a practical point of view, by reverting to what 
he sees as the traditional formula: asking whether the wrongful actings were, on the other hand, a 
“frolic” of the employee’s own devising and execution and thus unconnected with what he was 
employed to do.76 However, contrary to Lord Carloway it is not clear that this would lead to the same 
result. Rather it appears to introduce consideration of why the employee did what they did and the 
purposes of their actions rather than an investigation into what they did and whether it relates to the 
nature of the employment.77 
Support for this fourth leg or additional test is found by Lord Carloway in the judgments of 
Lord Hobhouse in Lister and Lord Millet in Dubai. His Lordship argued that 
 
“there is much to be said for asking, within the context of establishing the close connection and 
thus that the employee was acting within the scope of employment, the question of whether, on 
the contrary, the employee was engaged in a ‘frolic’ of his own”. 
 
He added to this saying 
 
                                                 
73 Wilson, 2010 S.L.T. 671 at [28]; Central Motors (Glasgow) Ltd v Cessnock Garage and Motor Co, 1925 S.C. 796; 
1925 S.L.T. 563. Importantly, also quoted by Lord Clyde in Lister. 
74 On this point, see M. Campbell, “Somerville Harsco Infrastructure Ltd: transferred intent and the scope of vicarious 
liability” (2016) 20(2) Edin. L.R. 211.  
75 Lord Carloway rejects in Vaickuviene, 2014 S.C. 147 at [35] that: “The relevant connection, which requires to be 
identified for the purposes of vicarious liability, is not that between Mr McCulloch’s racist views and his wrongdoing, 
but that between Mr McCulloch’s employment duties and that wrongdoing.” However, the analysis offered in this article 
suggests that invoking the question of whether or not the employee was on a frolic of their own as a first order question, 
does exactly that. 
76 Wilson, 2010 S.L.T. 671 at [26]. 
77 This approach has been consistently rejected by English courts, see recently Wm Morrison Supermarkets Plc v Various 
Claimants [2018] EWCA Civ 2339; [2019] 2 W.L.R. 99. However, it should be noted that leave has been given to appeal 
this decision to the Supreme Court. 
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“there is a crucial distinction between these cases [where an employee uses violence whilst 
engaged in their employer’s business] and the situation where the employee is not doing 
something in connection with his duties but is engaged on a ‘frolic’ of his own, in a sense of 
acting purely on a private venture unconnected with his work”.78 
 
In effect, this approach means that the court considers the motive of the employee when assessing 
whether there is a connection between the act and the employment. Although Lord Carloway denies 
this is the case in Vaickuviene, it is difficult to maintain.79 Because without any clear demarcation 
between the question of motive and what should be the separate question regarding the act’s 
relationship to the nature of the employment, the Inner House has, in effect, introduced a 
consideration of the motive into the course of employment test.80 In describing and characterising the 
connection in terms of whether the employee was on a frolic of his/her own, the focus moves to the 
individual act, which invariably includes consideration of motive or intention. This is important and 
relatively distinctive when compared to the approach now taken by the Supreme Court, which will 
be discussed further below.81  
The emergence of a difference between the Supreme Court and the Inner House became clear 
three years after Wilson, in Vaickuviene v J Sainsbury Plc.82 Vaickuviene is consistent with Wilson, 
in terms of how it interpreted Lister, the methods it used and its general reluctance to discuss or appeal 
to policy when making its decision. Of note, however, is that the Inner House emphasised that the 
approach taken by Lord Phillips in Catholic Welfare Society was “rather different from that adopted 
by most, if not all, of the judges in Lister”.83 The Supreme Court in Catholic Welfare Society departed 
from the more narrow approach in Lister by leaning towards a Canadian understanding of how the 
connection between the wrong and the employment should be considered. Lord Phillips said in 
Catholic Welfare Society “there must be a strong connection between what the employer was asking 
the employee to do (the risk created by the employer’s enterprise) and the wrongful act”. He went on 
to say: 
 
                                                 
78 Wilson, 2010 S.L.T. 671 at [32]. 
79 Vaickuviene, 2014 S.C. 147 at [35]–[36]. 
80 See Campbell’s analysis too, where a similar point is made with regard to the lack of conceptual clarity in such an 
approach: Campbell, “Somerville Harsco Infrastructure Ltd: transferred intent and the scope of vicarious liability” (2016) 
20(2) Edin. L.R. 211.  
81 See Mohamud [2016] A.C. 677, per Lord Toulson at [47] and [48]. Also see the Court of Appeal’s decision in a separate 
case: Wm Morrison Supermarkets Plc v Various Claimants [2019] 2 W.L.R. 99 at [75]–[76]. 
82 Vaickuviene, 2014 S.C. 147. 
83 Vaickuviene, 2014 S.C. 147, per Lord Carloway at [22]. 
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“It must be possible to say that the employer significantly increased the risk of the harm by 
putting the employee in his or her position and requiring him to perform the assigned tasks.”84 
 
As Lord Carloway described it, “this was the introduction of the ‘enterprise risk’ … or the ‘creation 
risk’ gloss on the imposition of liability”.85 For Lord Carloway, you could explain and justify holding 
someone responsible for the wrong of another on the basis of the risk that person creates by asking 
someone else to do something, but the wider policy goals of vicarious liability or the justification of 
this doctrine has not been part of the legal criteria used by courts when trying to determine the 
outcome of individual cases. Whether you have created a risk or not and what that risk was, according 
to Lord Carloway, has not been used by courts when determining whether an act complained of was 
committed within the course of employment. Rather for the Inner House, the traditional Salmond 
formula as articulated by the House of Lords in Lister was what a court should ask and consider when 
determining whether an action was carried out within the course of employment. He noted that “it 
may be said that it is now easier than hitherto to impose vicarious liability in the situation where the 
employer’s business creates … a general risk of harm” or “where that part of the business for which 
the employee was engaged, created such a risk”.86  
Lord Carloway, however, wished to note that you could nevertheless achieve the same result 
as this if you asked whether the act was an unauthorised mode of doing an authorised action without 
the risk of confusing policy questions with legal questions. Moreover, he stressed that the approach 
of assessing the risk created by the employment was in “danger of confusing direct with vicarious 
liability”.87 It was best, according to the Inner House, to stay within the confines of the existing tests 
established in Lister and without recourse to questions of whether the enterprise increased the risk of 
the wrong happening. In Vaickuviene, the Inner House was keen to stress that this area of law should 
be developed incrementally and that thus far the precedents allow for vicarious liability to be attached 
in cases of sexual abuse of children in care, abuse and harassment within the workplace, and violent 
attacks carried out by bouncers, sports persons, those tasked with discipline, and the police. To 
venture beyond these existing categories, was in danger of “subverting the democratic process” and 
should be approached with great caution. Implicit, therefore, in the judgment given, particularly by 
Lord Carloway, was that to follow the approach advocated by Lord Phillips, was to ask questions that 
                                                 
84 Catholic Child Welfare Society [2013] 2 A.C. 1, per Lord Phillips at [42]. 
85 Vaickuviene, 2014 S.C. 147, per Lord Carloway at [22]. 
86 Vaickuviene, 2014 S.C. 147, per Lord Carloway at [24]. 
87 Vaickuviene, 2014 S.C. 147, per Lord Carloway at [24]. 
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were far too wide and unnecessary, particularly when, many cases can be solved by using the existing 
tests as discussed by the House of Lords in Lister. 
  
VI. MOHAMUD APPROACH 
 
Mohamud continued along the same lines as Catholic Welfare Society. Some might say that there has 
always been a degree of uncertainty with regard to how Lister should be interpreted and, therefore, 
Mohamud attempts to offer some clarification following the decision in Catholic Welfare Society. On 
that basis, it could also be said that the difference between Lister and recent Supreme Court decisions, 
is that the Supreme Court is more forthcoming about the grounds upon which its decisions have been 
made whereas the House of Lords in Lister was unwilling to discuss the rationale or policy behind its 
decision. The first area of uncertainty related to whether the House of Lords, in Lister, replaced, 
overruled or reformulated the traditional Salmond questions; the second related to the basis upon 
which vicarious liability could be justified, explained and extended; and the third concerned the 
method to be used when applying the close connection test—do you take a causal approach or do you 
take a sufficiency approach or use some other kind of method, such as that taken by the Inner House’s 
focus on the motives of the wrongdoer?  
First, Lord Toulson implied, as previous courts have, that the close connection test was a 
reformulation of the Salmond formula but acknowledged, like the Lords did in Lister, that the wording 
of those tests was sometimes constraining or unworkable but the principle remained the same.88 Lord 
Toulson wished to demonstrate the incremental development of the law and that the approach taken 
by the Supreme Court was consistent with the historic approach taken by English law as early as the 
late seventeenth century. Overall, he wished to stress that the approach taken in Mohamud was no 
significant departure but rather a clarification of a historic position.  
Secondly, Lord Toulson also made clear that the doctrine of vicarious liability, according to 
him, is based on an employer’s responsibility for their overall enterprise, its consequences and the 
risks that that enterprise brings with it. It is on this basis that an employer is made strictly liable for 
the actions of an employee. Such strict liability was justified, according to Lord Toulson, and could 
be extended in some circumstances, because although the employer is personally innocent they 
nevertheless create the risk of the wrong happening, or have put the wheels in motion which 
ultimately caused the damage, or have asked someone to do something for them which carries with 
it the hazard or an element of peril which in fact materialises.  
                                                 
88 Mohamud [2016] A.C. 677 at [26]–[28], [43].  
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Thirdly, he also opted for the more liberal method of determining the scope of employment 
taken by the Canadian Supreme Court but passed over by the House of Lords in Lister. Therefore, 
when the court says it is taking a broad approach to determining the scope of employment, that 
involves consideration of the employer’s general enterprise and the risks that enterprise might create. 
It is not just about being generous when interpreting the particular employment’s written terms and 
conditions and what the employee has been specifically tasked with but also how the employee’s 
wrongdoing relates to the general risks inherent within the particular enterprise of the employer rather 
than the individual motives of the employee.  
In taking this approach, it is also clear that the Supreme Court was comfortable with a judge 
determining whether liability should be extended on the basis of policy, saying 
 
“the court must decide whether there is a sufficient connection … to make it right for the 
employer to be held liable under the principle of social justice which goes back to Holt CJ”.89 
 
A court, therefore, can determine what risks are associated with a particular enterprise and determine 
whether strict liability can be attached to the employer in those circumstances. Using the term “field 
of activities” rather than “authorised acts” or scope of employment offers more opportunity for a 
wider assessment of the nature of employment and whether those activities carry with them risks for 
which the employer should be responsible. That wider assessment, however, may be significant and 
involve policy decisions. Lord Hobhouse in Lister had sought to keep questions of policy, such as 
this, separate from concerning criteria-based questions such as the scope of employment, but Lord 
Phillips in Catholic Welfare90 said that it was not possible to keep both questions separate and 
separating policy questions from criteria questions is not part of the criteria formulated by Lord 
Toulson.91  
Fourthly, Lord Toulson was less concerned with the personal motive of the employee and 
whether that coincided with the wrongful act, rendering it beyond the course of employment, than he 
was with the timing and the chain of events which led to the wrong being committed. There was more 
focus on whether there was a link in time and space between what the employee did and their field of 
activities than on whether their own personal intentions coincided with the tasks being performed but 
had no bearing on furthering the employer’s enterprise. Less consideration was given to questions of 
whether the act was purely personal or incidental to the task of the employee and more concern was 
                                                 
89 Mohamud [2016] A.C. 677 at [45]. 
90 Mohamud [2016] A.C. 677 at [94]. 
91 Mohamud [2016] A.C. 677 at [44]. 
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given to whether there was a separation in time and space between the employee performing their 
tasks and the wrong complained of. It appears, if you follow the Mohamud approach, that a separation 
in time and space is more likely to render the task beyond the course of employment rather than 
demonstrating that, despite an outward appearance suggesting otherwise, the employee’s intentions 
had nothing to do with their employment and, therefore, put it beyond the course of employment. 
 
VII. APPROACHES COMPARED 
 
As has been described above, the Inner House has developed its own answers to the questions Lord 
Toulson answered in Mohamud. Like the Supreme Court, the Inner House maintains that Lister was 
a reformulation of the Salmond formula rather than a rewriting of the law. This, however, is not how 
either the Outer House or the sheriff courts have understood Lister; for them, Lister did fundamentally 
alter the law of vicarious liability. Stressing the continuity between Lister and the Salmond formula 
is probably where the similarities in approach between the Inner House and the Supreme Court end. 
Unlike the Supreme Court, the Inner House has taken a fairly modest and blunt approach, confidently 
assuming that the lines between policy, principle and precedent are clear. Hence it has stressed that 
questions of policy or rationale are generally unnecessary and irrelevant to whether an action was 
within the course of employment. Rather the Inner House has felt able to resolve questions relating 
to vicarious liability by supposedly relying on existing precedent, existing tests, and following the 
guidance given by Lord Clyde and Lord Steyn in Lister. It has chosen not to follow the approach of 
the Canadian Supreme Court; it has not assessed the general risks inherent within the enterprise 
undertaken by the employer, but rather defined the nature of employment with regard to the task 
specified and the role given to the employee.  
In Vaickuviene, the Inner House emphasised that general considerations of the risk a particular 
enterprise creates should not be considered by the court and it should in alternative confine itself to 
the existing tests articulated in Lister and follow the established precedents when it comes to 
intentional wrongs. Additionally, along with asking whether there is a sufficiently close connection 
between the employment and the act, it has generally stressed the distance between the wrong and 
the nature of the employment rather than look for a connection. This approach has surely been the 
result of the Inner House asking an additional question or using a method of identifying the actions 
of the employee as either personal or intending to further the employers’ enterprise. In effect, the 
Inner House asks about the employee’s motive; it asks the related but separate question of whether 
the wrong complained of can be described as a frolic or a purely personal matter. If the answer to that 
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question is yes, then you should not consider the act as falling within the course of employment. It 
could also be added that in terms of attitude the Court of Session has been conservative and cautious 
in terms of applying Lister and generally hesitant to develop the law in this area. However, in 
Mohamud, Lord Toulson, as has been shown, offered a new take on these specific questions and 
demonstrated a confidence when it came to the development of vicarious liability. 
 
VIII. FURTHER QUESTIONS 
 
Before concluding, it must be acknowledged that the evolution of the law in this area raises several 
questions about the way by which the law of vicarious liability has developed and whether this is how 
Scots courts now operate or perceive their role; it has been developed in England and Wales by a self-
conscious and confident appellant judiciary. But this of course raises familiar questions: should a 
court develop liability in this manner92; can a court appropriately consider policy questions93; what 
do we mean when we say policy?94 It also leads to well-known concerns that the doctrine is too open 
and susceptible to subjective interpretation of facts; that the political nature of these questions makes 
the law hopelessly indeterminate; and that justice is being distributed but wrongs are not being 
corrected. Further, it invites consideration of the rationale or justification upon which the Supreme 
Court has developed vicarious liability in recent years and if that is consistent with the general 
approach of tort law in England and Wales.  
These questions cannot, however, be answered adequately here, but they do need to be 
considered by a court and in secondary literature. For although these questions about the Scots courts’ 
interpretation of Lister or the Supreme Court’s approach in Mohamud may appear subtle and possibly 
pedantic, their application and interpretation deal with a significant transfer of liability or 
responsibility—not just legal, but also financial and moral—for a wrong committed by another. Of 
course, for some the flexibility and inconsistency of this area is unsurprising, if you take a more 
critical attitude towards the possibility of judicial reasoning to be coherent and objective. Whereas 
for others who strive to uphold consistency and certainty in judicial decision-making, in recent years 
the doctrine of vicarious liability is arguably a troublesome and challenging area. Scots lawyers need 
                                                 
92 J. Stapleton, “Duty of Care Factors: A Selection from the Judicial Menu” in P. Cane and J. Stapleton (eds), The Law of 
Obligations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), pp.59–95; R. Stevens, Torts and Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007), pp.306–314; A. Beever, Rediscovering the Law of Negligence (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007), pp.171–173; J. 
Morgan, “Policy reasoning in tort law: the courts, the Law Commission and the critics” (2009) 125(2) L.Q.R. 215. 
93 Anns v Merton LBC [1978] A.C. 728; [1977] 2 W.L.R. 1024; Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] A.C. 53; 
[1988] 2 W.L.R. 1049; Tomlinson v Congleton BC [2003] UKHL 47; [2004] 1 A.C. 46; Smith v Chief Constable of Sussex 
[2008] UKHL 50; [2009] 1 A.C. 225; Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2018] UKSC 4; [2018] A.C. 
736. 
94 J. Plunkett, “Principle and policy in private law reasoning” (2016) 75(2) C.L.J. 366. 
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to consider these questions. For present purposes, however, the first step has been to set out the 
position in Scotland and to compare it with the approach taken in Mohamud leaving these wider 




Since Mohamud, the High Court and the Court of Appeal95 have followed Lord Toulson’s approach 
and thus far expressed no difficulty in applying it; although it could be said that the full potential of 
Lord Toulson’s approach is yet to be tested. Edinburgh Sheriff Court has already cited and used 
Mohamud96 and most would suspect, given the Inner House’s deferential attitude to the Supreme 
Court, that it would follow the approach taken by Lord Toulson in Mohamud. It should be noted that 
the decision in Mohamud is, technically speaking, highly persuasive and not effectively binding upon 
a Scottish court. This leaves the theoretical option to take a different path and follow the example of 
other jurisdictions, such as Australia, that have taken a different route from the UK Supreme Court. 
However, for many it would be surprising if the Inner House was bold or innovative in this area and, 
moreover, it would be undesirable to introduce any divergence within the UK when it comes to the 
liability of an employer. Arguably Mohamud is clear about its rationale, and furthering social justice 
should be pursued particularly in an area such as vicarious liability. However, the divergence in 
approach between the Inner House and the Supreme Court cannot be ignored, particularly when the 
Inner House jurisprudence emphasises motive rather than enterprise in its analysis. Pursuers and 
claimants will try, when the opportunity arises, to apply the approach method and reasoning used in 
Mohamud, and attach liability where it would otherwise be difficult to establish if one were to rely 
solely on the approach taken by the Inner House. Not only are previous decisions which relied on 
Lister now “open to question or possibly not followed”,97 but some commentators have questioned 
whether it is appropriate for strict liability to be extended in this manner by the judiciary.98 As noted, 
these specific questions are beyond the scope of this article; for now setting out the approach in 
Scotland compared to that of the Supreme Court is the more pressing issue. On the basis of the 
analysis provided here, it is clear that if the Inner House were to follow the Supreme Court’s approach 
                                                 
95 Playboy Club London Ltd v Banca Nazionale del Lavoro SpA [2016] EWCA Civ 457; [2016] 1 W.L.R. 3169 at [10]; 
Axon v Ministry of Defence [2016] EWHC 787 (QB); [2016] E.M.L.R. 20 at [81]–[84]; Frederick v Positive Financial 
Solutions (Financial Services) Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 431 at [76]; Bellman v Northampton Recruitment Ltd [2018] EWCA 
Civ 2214; [2019] 1 All E.R. 1133 at [12]–[35]; Barclays Bank Plc v Various Claimants [2018] EWCA Civ 1670; [2018] 
I.R.L.R. 947 at [41]–[61]; Wm Morrison Supermarkets Plc v Various Claimants [2019] 2 W.L.R. 99 at [61]–[78]. 
96 Grubb, 2018 S.L.T. (Sh. Ct) 193. 
97 G. Junor, “Vicarious liability—redefined?”, 2016 S.L.T. (News) 125, 131. 
98 P. Giliker, “Vicarious Liability in the UK Supreme Court” (2016) 7 UK Supreme Court Yearbook 152, 159. 
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in the future, this would be a change in the interpretation and application of the law of vicarious 
liability in Scotland. Whether that is a good thing or not, is another question. 
 
